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UNIVERSITY RESEARCH-A NEW DEFENSE
UNDER THE PATENT LAW
Judith L Cury* & Bruce E. O'Connor**
I. INTRODUCTION
Basic, applied, and sponsored research at or under the auspices of a university
results in the conception and reduction to practice of numerous patentable
inventions. The benefit of these academic patents both to the research mission
of universities and to the economy as a whole has been measured in the context
of royalty income and tax revenues. A recent article in the Quarterl Journalof the
I"censing Executives Sodqy reported that royalty income to U.S. universities,
hospitals and research institutes has grown from around seven million in 1980,
when Bayh-Dole was enacted, to over one billion in 2001. The same article,
analyzing data produced by a 1996 study conducted by MIT, concludes that at the
royalty levels of 2001, tax revenues would have been almost ten billion
dollars-over one-third of the amount the federal government currently invests
annually in university research.2
Notwithstanding the economic value that academic patents clearly have,
judicial decisions have recently cast doubt on the viability of two concepts of
patent law that have been of particular importance to universities conducting
research leading to innovative developments. 3 One is the "experimental use
exception," providing that, as long as experimentation continues, the university
can seek patent protection even though the university violates the public use
statutory bar to patentability incorporated in the patent law.4 The other is the
"research exemption," providing that the university has a defense to a claim of
patent infringement if its activities are for philosophical experiments without
5
intent to infringe on the patent rights of others.
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•* Seattle, Washington, bruce.oconnor@att.net (formerly, Senior Member, Christensen
O'Connor Johnson Kindness PLLC).
Ashley Stevens, 20 Years of Academic L'censing-Rqya/y Income and Economic Impact, XXXVIII
QUARTERIYJOURNAI. OI 'IHF LIcENSING Exiu.CUr1vi1 Socivlry 133, 139 (2003).
2 Id; see also Press Release, Kenneth D. Campbell, TLO says Government Research Pays Off
Through $3 Billion in Taxes (Apr. 15, 1998) (on file with author).
3 See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., 525 U.S. 55,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998); Madey v. Duke Univ.,
307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813); Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

1

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2

j. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 12:29

II. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION
The patent laws bar patent protection for any invention that is in public use
or on sale in the United States more than one year prior to the filing of an
application for U.S. patent for that invention.6 These "public use" and "on sale"
bars to patentability have long been subject to the experimental use exception,
which is found where the public use or sale is primarily for purposes of
experimentation.7 The intent of the inventor is critical to this determination, and
such intent can be inferred from the actions of the inventor.8 If the experimentation is designed and is reasonably necessary to determine the functional viability
of the invention or whether further improvement is needed, then the intent of the
inventor is primarily for purposes of experimentation.' If the experimentation
goes beyond what is needed to determine functional viability or the need for
further improvements, and instead looks at the commercial viability of the
invention, the intent of the inventor is primarily for commercial purposes and the
exception is not met.' ° In determining intent, the courts usually look to the
totality of circumstances involving the allegedly experimental use.'
The policy behind the public use and on-sale bars is to: discourage the
removal of inventions from the public domain that the public believes are freely
available (e.g., commercial), encourage the prompt and widespread disclosure of
inventions, prohibit the inventor from commercially exploiting an invention for
a longer period than that prescribed by statute (e.g., the term of the patent, which
is measured from the application filing date), and to allow inventors reasonable
time to determine whether an invention is worthwhile. 2
Based on these policy considerations, courts have held that the experimental
use exception did not apply where the inventor placed no limitations on use of
the invention, failed to conduct any tests or experiments, failed to adjust or
modify the invention during a period of commercial sale, and conducted forprofit demonstrations extending beyond those demonstrations reasonably

(C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
6 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).
' City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877).
8 Id. at 136.
9 Id at 136-37.
10 See In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1136, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 1441-42
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
" SeeLoughv. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113,1120,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1100, 1105 (Fed.
Ci. 1996); Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192,1198-1200,31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325-26
(Fed. Cit. 1994).
12 Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198.
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necessary to demonstrate functionality.13 Courts have found experimental use
where the inventor did place restrictions on disclosure of information relating to
the invention, the inventor retained control over devices embodying the
invention, and where the inventor limited testing to that necessary to evaluate
functionality. 4
Although the experimental use exception remains viable in relation to the
public use bar, its applicability to the on-sale bar is uncertain at the present time.
The case of Pfaffv. Wells Electronics held that the on-sale bar is present where the
invention is the subject of a sale or offer to sell and the invention is "ready for
patenting."15 This latter requirement means that the inventor has either reduced
the invention to practice or that the invention's conception is far enough along
so that the patent application will serve as a constructive reduction to practice. 6
In either case, the inventor has determined the basic functionality of the
invention, although further experimentation may be needed to demonstrate that
such functionality is consistent and repeatable. In such circumstances, it is
difficult for the inventor to establish that the sale was primarily for purposes of
experimentation.
III. THE

RESEARCH EXEMPTION

The second area of patent law that is threatened by recent case law is the
research exemption. The patent law finds infringement of a U.S. patent by
anyone "who makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention" in the
U.S.17 In the past, courts have subjected infringement to a judicially created
research exemption, which applies wherever the manufacture, use, offer to sell or
sale is free of commercial motivations and is "merely for experimental
purposes."' 8 As with the experimental use exception, the intent of the inventor
is critical to this determination, and the court can infer such intent from the
actions of the inventor. 19
The policy behind the research exemption is to encourage the development
of patented inventions, so as to meet the constitutional aim of the patent law,

13 See Int'l Tooth-Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1891); Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co.

v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 254-57 (1887); Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90, 97 (1883); Egbert v.
Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 334 (1881); In Re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1134; Lough, 86 F.3d at 1120.
14 Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. at 133-37.
15 Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 65-66, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646-47 (1998).
16 See id at 67-68.
17 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002).
" Ruth v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697,713,29 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 400,410 (D. Colo.
1935), rev'don othergrounds,87 F.2d 35, 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (10th Cir. 1936).
19 Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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which is to promote scientific and technological progress. ° Some argue that
requiring university researchers to obtain a license to patented technology will not
impede research progress. 2' This might be true but for the fact that patent law in
the United States does not provide for compulsory licensing. 22 A university
research thus can be enjoined from further activity in a specific field covered by
a patent if the patent holder decides to enforce the right to exclude that is granted
by the patent law. Consequently, in addition to the economic impact, the
abolition of the research exemption has social implications in that it may deter
innovation and improvement of existing technologies which are beneficial to the
public health and welfare.
Courts have held that the research exemption applies where the alleged
infringing activities were conducted for the purposes of philosophical experiment,
or to gratify a philosophical taste, or for mere amusement; as part of educational
activities and to further an educational mission of the inventor; with no intent to
derive profits or practical advantage; merely for experimental purposes; with no
intended commercial use of the invention; or free of any commercial
motivations.23
The viability of the research exemption is uncertain at the present time. In
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo.,24 the Federal Circuit found that
experiments conducted by a pharmaceutical company that are consistent with the
business of the company, and not strictly for philosophical inquiry, are not
protected under the research exception. 25 The recent case of Madey v. Duke
University held that where the research was consistent with the infringer's business,
regardless of the research's immediate or ultimate commercial implications, the
research exemption could not apply.26 Thus, an organization whose primary

2" See U.S. CONSr. art. I,

8, cl. 8 (permitting the patent system to "promote the Progress of

Science and useful Arts").
2' Stephen G. Kunin& Linda S. Therkorn, Worksbop on FuturePubicPo/4 andEthicalIssuesFacing
the Biotechnology Industty, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 501, 502 (2004).
JAY DRATI.IR, LICENSING OF IN'TI..ECI
UAI. PROPER'IY § 3.03(2)(a) (1994).
21 See, e.g., Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 Fed. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Int'l Rectifier Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 157, 161 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Ruth, 13 F. Supp. at 713.
24 733 F.2d 858, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937 (Fed. Cit. 1984).
25 Id at 863. The Roche Products case was followed by the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and Amendments, which provide a limited research exception to companies for the manufacture,
use, or sale (with certain exceptions) "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulate the manufacturer, use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biological products." Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). For a
discussion of this statute and related cases, see Pradip K. Sahu & K. Shannon Mrksich, The HatchIWaxman Act: When is Research Exemptfrom PatentInfingement?, 22 No. 4 INTEIJ.CIUAI. PROPF.RTY
LAw NEWSi.E1:t'rj, R 23 (2004).
2, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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purpose or "business" is research is subject to infringement charges with respect
to research that is fundamental, basic, and not related in any way to any
commercial products or services. Indeed, one might conclude from the Madeg
rationale that any research receiving federal funding would be "commercial" since
a principal goal of the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal statute permitting universities
to retain title to inventions arising from federally funded research, is "to promote
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United
States."27 Moreover, the appellate court in Madly expressed the opinion that even
education is the "business" of a university. 28 The lower court seized upon the
appellate court's opinion in its decision following remand of the case, finding that
Duke had failed to meet its burden that it was entitled to summary judgment on
the research exemption defense because Duke had conceded "that at least some
of its uses of [Madey's] patents 'unmistakenly further [its] legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participation
in these projects.' "2 9
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR REFORM
The full economic impact of these court rulings may not be assessed precisely
for decades, but without court action or legislative reform, it is beyond argument
that only a small percentage of university research today would satisfy the criteria
for exemption from infringement. Given the extremely important role that
universities have in conducting basic research and contributing to the scientific
knowledge base, the time may have come to consider a statutory research
exemption similar to those in place in the United Kingdom and Europe.30
As can be seen from the foregoing exposition, there are clear parallels (and not
so subtle differences) between the experimental use exception and the research
exemption. In both, the intent of the actor to engage in experimentation and the
lack of commercialization have been the primary tests for determining whether
the exception and the exemption have been met. These parallels, and the current
uncertainty in the law as to the viability of the experimental use exception and the
exemption, lead one to conclude that Congress or the courts should replace both
the exception and the exemption with a single defense to statutory bars and
infringement claims. This defense will provide metes and bounds that are clear
and definite, logical, consistent with the constitution, and supportive of the basic
goals of the patent law.

27
28
21

35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362,64 U.S.P.Q.2d (1NA) 1737,1746 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97CV01170, 2004 WL 2148935, at *7 (M.D.N.C. 2004).

"' Patent Act, 1977, ch. 37, S 60(5)(b) (Eng.).
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The U.S. Constitution states that the Congress shall have power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
'
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "31
It is difficult to reconcile the holding in Madey v. Duke with this constitutional
statement of purpose. The patent law regarding infringement, as it has developed
inthe United States, would appear to preclude any innovation or improvement
on a patented article or process by anyone other than the patentee.
Discoveries or "inventions" are not protectable as traditional property because
they are in the form of intangible knowledge or information (except by contract
and then only between the contracting parties).32 This proposition is illustrated
from the fact that numerous persons may independently make the same invention
and may each have the right to use that invention without accounting to the
other.33 In this scenario, the first or any other inventor has no right to control use
of the invention by the other inventors.34
Patent law, pursuant to the constitutional clause quoted above, transforms an
invention into property by granting a selected inventor (the first to invent under
current U.S. law) the right to exclude all others, for a limited time, from making,
using or selling the invention.3" The policy considerations behind the "authors
and inventors" constitutional clause and its implementation in the patent law have
been vigorously debated for many years.36 The most cogent analysis seems to be
based on economics. The economic costs to patenting include: the cost of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); the cost of the judiciary in acting as
an appellate body from decisions of the USPTO, and in enforcing patents; the
cost to patent holders in obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing patents; the cost
to others in avoiding or paying for infringement claims; a decreased supply of
patented goods, in that they are available if at all, from a single source; depletion
of resources, in that research and development resources are put into areas that
can be patented (because of increased profit) instead of other areas, such as basic
research, that cannot be patented; and deterrence of inventive activity in an area
that is patented, again because of the control that can be exercised by the
patentee.37
On balance, however, the economic benefits of patenting have been thought
to significantly outweigh the economic costs. 38 One principal economic benefit

" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
32 R. CARl. MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:27 (4th ed. 2003).
33 Id
34 Id

31 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
36 U.S.CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 8; MOY, supra note 32, % 1:11, 1:28-29.
31 See id § 1:34.
31 Id § 1:36.
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is the actual and potential increased profit that the patentee can obtain, given
patenting of the invention and the consequent right to control in some way the
invention and its commercialization.39 Another principal economic benefit is the
direct and indirect advantage that the public receives as a consequence of
commercialization of a patented invention, resulting in less expensive and higher
quality goods either employing or made by use of the invention. 4° Other benefits,
although highly touted, are now believed to be illusory.41 The principal of these
benefits is based on a bilateral contract theory, in which the inventor promises to
make full disclosure of the invention in exchange for the promise by the
government of a time-limited right to exclude.42 Commentators have pointed out
that such disclosure is made primarily for the purpose of telling infringers what
they can and cannot do, that commercialization in most cases results in disclosure
even broader right (i.e., one that is not
anyway, and that trade secret law gives an
43
time-limited) than does the patent law.
The most viable and primary rationale for patenting that expressly recognizes
its economic benefits is based on a theory of unilateral contract: The promise of
a limited-term right to exclude is given for the performance of invention and
innovation.44 In other words, innovation can be viewed as a broader term
extending from the conception of an invention, through its reduction to practice,
to its commercialization. This rationale is based on the premise that inventors
will not innovate, or at least not in an optimal manner, unless they are given the
potential of substantially increased profits resulting from the limited-term right
to exclude and the consequent ability to control the commercialization of their
inventions.45
This unilateral contract theory has been expressly recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court on many occasions. 46 The Court in its various pronouncements
also continues to make reference to the disclosure goal, or bilateral contract
theory, by stating that the rationale of fostering and rewarding inventions and

" Id. 1:38.
40 Id § 1:34.
41JOHN W. SCHLICTER, PATENT LAW, LEGALAND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 2:10 (2d ed. 2003).
Moy, supra note 32, § 1:42.
" Other comments include: giving just rewards to the inventor (but the potential rewards under
the patent law far exceed those necessary to make the inventor whole for his or her efforts); and
permitting the patent holder to control the orderly development of a new technology and its
commercialization (but it is rare that a single patent or group of patents will dominate an entire
technology). Id. § 1:37.
' Id § 1:38.
4s Id
42

' See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4
(1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 678
(1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524, 527.
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stimulating innovation also includes the disclosure of inventions in a manner that

allows the public to use the inventions after expiration of the patent.47 The Court
has stated an additional goal of setting forth stringent requirements for
patentability in the patent law so that ideas and inventions in the public domain
are left in the public domain and not patented. 8
The literal wording of the constitutional provision 9 ("to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts") and the primary rationale of the patent law ("to
stimulate and foster invention and innovation")5" are clearly not met by a system
in which researchers cannot patent their inventions and are also subject to
infringement claims, notwithstanding their lack of commercialization or intent to
commercialize.
V. THE PROPOSED RESEARCH DEFENSE

The time has come for an explicit recognition of a "research defense" that
tolls the effect of the public use and on-sale bars, based on the acts of the
researcher, and that defeats a claim for infringement relating to those acts based
on the patent of a third party. This research defense should be established
whenever the acts of the researcher are primarily for purposes of experimentation,
and the acts of the researcher do not rise to the level of commercial exploitation.
This approach is consistent with the law of the United Kingdom, for example,
which defines experimental use for purposes of its research exemption to include
acts "done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the
invention."" This language covers investigations seeking to improve 52or modify
the invention, but would not apply to commercial trials, for example.
This rule brings the experimental use exception and the research exemption
under one roof by employing a doctrine that is consistent with most of the case
law pertaining to the experimental use exception. Most importantly, this rule is
entirely consistent with the primary rationale of patent law, in that researchers will
be able to complete their inventions without the threat of infringement claims or
the loss of patent rights. Stimulation of invention and innovation is paramount,
especially for an organization such as a university whose principal role and reason
for existence is the preservation, expansion, and distribution of human knowledge.
" Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
48 Id

U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8.
. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
, Patent Act, 1977, ch. 37, 5 60(5)(b) (Eng.).
'2

W.R. CORNISH, INTIIII.CIUAI. PROP1IAT Y: PA'I,NIS, COPYRIGHI, TRAfIw-MARKS AND

AiJIF,D RI(;HrS 214 (3d ed. 1996).
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail those acts constituting
commercial exploitation that terminate the research defense. There should be no
question that acts directed to basic research should always be subject to the
research defense, since such acts have little or no relationship to commercialization. A question does arise with reference to acts directed to applied research,
because the ties between such acts and commercialization are often evident,
especially as to research that is sponsored by a company and directed to a specific
technology that is being or will be commercially exploited by the company. One
thing should be certain-that the acts of the university will not be commercial
exploitation simply because they are in support of the "business" of the
university."
How the research defense comes into existence depends to a large extent on
the courts. Certainly, the constitutional basis for the defense, and its support in
the primary rationale for the patent law, give the courts the authority to
implement the defense without the need for legislation. Congress can, and should
if needed, legislate the defense in support of its own constitutional mandate.

5' A potential conflict with the "strict requirements" goal of the patent law is noted. See David
W. Carstens & Craig Allen Nard, Conception andthe 'UnSale"Bar,34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 425
(1993); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Sdence: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U. CHI. L. REV.1017, 1075-76 (1989). But the statutory bars relating to public use and sale have
long been recognized as "patent loss" provisions, see Michael A. Cicero & Lance D. Reich, Time's
Up! Inaction Causes Loss of PatentRights, 10 SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYER 32,35 (1999) (in support of
the early disclosure requirement), rather than pulling something from the public domain that is
already there (otherwise, a tautology results!).
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